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Abstra t
We present one way in whi h ombinatorial designs an be used
to give onditionally perfe t se ret sharing s hemes. S hemes formed
in this way have the advantage over lassi al se ret sharing s hemes
of being easily adapted for use as ompartmentalized or hierar hi al
a ess stru tures.
We study the problem of ompletion of stru tures, given partial
information, to obtain measures of how losely the behaviour of the
se ret sharing s hemes approa hes to ideal behaviour in pra ti e.
It may happen that part of a ombinatorial design an never be
re onstru ted from a subset of a minimal de ning set. That is, to nd
the blo ks of what is alled the strongbox of a given minimal de ning
set of a design, we must have the whole of the minimal de ning set
and be able to omplete the whole design. The strongbox is that
part of the design whi h may most safely be used to hold se ret
information. We study the size of the strongbox.
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1. Motivation

Computer systems require sophisti ated se urity, best attained when a
key or password is shared between several people in su h a way that it an
only be re onstru ted by a suÆ iently large and responsible group a ting
in agreement. Shared se urity systems are used in banks, in other nan ial
institutions, in ommuni ations networks and in omputing systems serving
edu ational institutions, though the best-known examples are military: for
instan e, in the a tivation of nu lear weapons or missiles, several oÆ ers
must on ur fully before the ne essary password an be re onstru ted.
S hemes for determining the distribution of the partial information to
the people involved are known as se ret sharing s hemes or a ess s hemes,
and lead to shared ontrol. The pie es of partial information whi h are
distributed are known as shares and may be of equal value (as in the military examples mentioned above) or more often of unequal value, probably
arranged a ording to a hierar hy of some kind. For example in a university
omputing system, shares whi h lead to the re onstru tion of the system
manager's or superuser's key are far more valuable than those whi h lead
only to a student's key.
Se ret sharing s hemes have often been based on onstru tions from nite geometries [?℄, numeri al linear algebra [?℄, the theory of error- orre ting
odes [?℄ and, more re ently, design theory [?℄. A geometri example is easy
to visualise. Suppose that the se ret is the ombination of a safe, and that
it onsists of three digits, xyz: We ould share the se ret between a group
of n people by giving ea h of them the equation of a plane through the
point (x; y; z):



If we hoose the planes so that their pairwise interse tions give distin t
lines through (x; y; z); then any two people an together determine a
line through the point and any three an determine the point itself,
and hen e the ombination of the lo k. This is an example of a (3; n)
threshold s heme with threshold three, meaning that any three of the
n shares determine the se ret, but no two shares determine it.



Suppose, on the other hand, we hoose the planes so that all but
one of them have a line, l, say, in ommon, and the remaining plane,
P , interse ts l in the point (x; y; z): Then nding the point requires
knowledge of the plane P and any two other planes. This means
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that the agreement of the person who knows P is essential for the
determination of the se ret, and the s heme is not just a threshold
s heme.
Situations where shares of unequal value are used arise often in pra ti e. For example, onsider the authorisation of ele troni transfer of large
amounts of money between nan ial institutions. One might expe t, say,
that two vi e-presidents ould jointly authorise the transfer of amounts
over $10 000 000, two junior vi e-presidents amounts between $1 000 000
and $10 000 000, two senior tellers amounts between $100 000 and $1 000 000
and two tellers lesser amounts. This is in a situation where the appropriate password is never revealed outside the ele troni fa ility (in the bank's
head oÆ e) whi h re onstru ts the password from the information shares
fed into it. What if a vi e-president and a junior vi e-president are delayed
in another ity by airport fog?
An obvious solution is to share the authorisation ode for transfer of
larger amounts of money between larger numbers of more junior sta , but
doing this eÆ iently presents a problem. At present, many a ess s hemes
are known and some of them, based on ombinatorial designs and nite
geometries, have been proved to be the best possible (in a theoreti al sense).

2. Designs

A ombinatorial design is a way of sele ting, from a nite set, X, a
olle tion of b subsets whi h meets ertain requirements. These b subsets
are usually referred to as the blo ks of the design. If all the blo ks ontain
the same number, k, of elements and if all the v elements of the underlying
set X o ur in the same number, r, of blo ks, the design is said to be a
blo k design. Counting the elements in the design shows that vr = bk:
A blo k design in whi h all pairs of elements o ur equally often, say 
times, is said to be balan ed; ounting pairs of elements in the design shows
that (v 1) = r(k 1): Su h a design is often referred to as a 2{(v; k; )
design sin e the parameters b and r an be al ulated from v; k and : In
parti ular, a 2-(v; 3; 1) design is alled a Steiner triple system, often denoted
by ST S(v): In this paper we are on erned only with simple designs, that
is, those in whi h no blo k is repeated.
As an example, suppose it is required to sele t from a given set, X;
subsets (blo ks) ontaining three elements ea h, and to sele t them in su h
3

a way that any pair of elements o urs in pre isely one blo k. Thus if we
start with the nine-element set X = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9g; then the
olle tion of 12 blo ks in any olumn Di of Table 1 ful ls our requirements,
forming an ST S(9): The boldfa e numbers in the leftmost olumn indi ate
the blo k numbers in ea h design. The horizontal lines indi ate the partition of the set of blo ks of ea h design into four olle tions of three pairwise
disjoint blo ks ea h, that is, into four parallel lasses of blo ks whi h partition the set X: What is more, it an be shown that every ST S(9) has
essentially the same stru ture as ea h Di :
#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

D

1

123
456
789
147
258
369
159
267
348
168
249
357

D

2

124
389
567
137
259
468
158
236
479
169
278
345

D

D

3

4

125
378
469
139
268
457
148
279
356
167
234
589

126
359
478
138
245
679
149
237
568
157
289
346

D

5

127
368
459
134
269
578
156
248
379
189
235
467

D

6

128
347
569
136
257
489
145
239
678
179
246
358

D

7

129
367
458
135
247
689
146
238
579
178
256
349

Table 1: Large set of 2-(9; 3; 1) designs
We note that the seven olumns of Table 1 give a partition of the set

of all 93 triples hosen from the set X into pairwise disjoint 2-(9; 3; 1)
designs. Su h a partition is known as a large set of designs and exists for
all ST S(v) for v 6= 7 [?, ?℄. It has been proposed by Stinson and Vanstone
[?℄ as a foundation on whi h to onstru t a threshold s heme. Suppose for
instan e that the se ret key is 5 and that it is to be shared among three
people. Then they ould be given the shares 1, 8 and 9 respe tively, the
key being the number of the design in whi h the blo k 189 appears. Ea h
element o urs four times in ea h design, so knowing that the design has
blo ks ontaining the element `1' is of no advantage to an individual trying
to guess the key. Similarly, sin e ea h pair o urs on e in ea h design,
4

knowing that the design has a blo k ontaining, say, the pair `18' is of no
advantage to a pair of shareholders trying to guess the key. But the set of
three shares uniquely identi es the design. Sin e this is true in general, we
have a (3; 3) threshold s heme.
Now we on entrate on the design labelled D1 ; and more formally, we
write D1 = (X; B1 ); where B1 is the set of blo ks of the design. Some subsets
of the set B1 have spe ial properties. The set of blo ks S(4) = f1; 2; 4; 5g
an be ompleted to a 2-(9; 3; 1) design in only one way, namely to D1 : The
same is true of the set S(5) = f1; 4; 5; 7; 11g: Ea h of these sets is said to
be a de ning set of the design D1 and, sin e no proper subset of either set
de nes D1 uniquely, ea h of them is a minimal de ning set.
On the other hand, the set of blo ks R = f1; 2; 5; 7g an be ompleted
to an ST S(9) in two ways, by adjoining the blo ks f3; 12g; together with
either
T = f147; 168; 249; 267; 348; 369g

to give the design D1 as before, or

T 0 = f148; 167; 247; 269; 349; 368g
to give a new design D0 : Then T and T 0 form a trade in the design; that
is, the set of blo ks T an be removed from the design D and repla ed by
the set T 0 to give a di erent design with the same parameters. Sin e no
subset of T an be traded to give an ST S(9); they form a minimal trade.
1

1

Every de ning set and every trade within a design must have at least
one ommon blo k, and the automorphism group of a de ning set is a
subgroup of the automorphism group of the design; see K Gray [?, ?, ?℄.
These properties have been essential in the development of algorithms for
nding minimal de ning sets; see Greenhill [?℄, Delaney [?℄. In nding
fast algorithms that omplete a design from a given partial design, blo k
interse tion patterns have been important, espe ially linkage; see Ramsay
[?℄, Utami [?℄, Lawren e [?℄.

3. Se ret Sharing S hemes

We are studying the problem of ompletion of stru tures, given partial
information, to obtain measures of how losely the behaviour of a se ret
sharing s heme approa hes to ideal behaviour in pra ti e. This allows omparison of the information ontent of the partial stru ture with that of the
5

omplete stru ture [?℄. In parti ular if the partial stru ture an be uniquely
ompleted then it, together with the rules for ompletion, ontains the same
information as the entire stru ture.
Even for small orders the number of inequivalent ombinatorial designs
grows extremely rapidly. Here this feature be omes a strength, sin e the
hoi e of parameters for whi h there are a very large number of inequivalent
designs makes the se ret sharing s heme more se ure.
As our model, we take a situation in whi h the group of parti ipants
in ludes a dealer (or trusted authority), as well as the shareholders.



In the distribution phase, the dealer hooses a 2-(v; k; ) design,
with suitable parameters, for whi h a (preferably minimal) de ning
set is known. A permutation is applied to the set of elements underlying the design, thus relabelling the elements of ea h blo kto hide any
stru tural information. Ea h parti ipant (ex ept the dealer) is given
a suitable size share, onsisting of one or more whole blo ks. Note
that no shareholder needs to know the parameters of the design.



In the ombination phase, ea h shareholder presents the given
share to the ombiner, who ompletes the design and hen e determines the key, by using the shares, the permutation, the parameters
v; k and ; the rules for ompletion and an algorithm for ompletion. In the s heme we are proposing, the key will be ontained in
the strongbox or part of the design most diÆ ult to re onstru t from
partial information; the strongbox is de ned formally in Se tion 4.

If a unique design is re onstru ted, then ea h shareholder an feel ondent that the others are who they say they are (a matter of mutual authenti ation) and that the se ret is as intended. If the design annot be
re onstru ted, then either someone has made a mistake or someone is trying to heat. How easily an an unauthorised group of shareholders heat?
In an ideal situation, we assume that no shareholder knows any of the
following:

[A1℄ parameters of the design;
[A2℄ size of the de ning set being used;
[A3℄ the permutation being applied to the elements.
6

But if there is any suspi ion of heating, it is prudent to assume that the
oalition of heaters know all of the following:
[C1℄ parameters of the design;
[C2℄ whi h of the inequivalent designs is being used;
[C3℄ whi h of the inequivalent permutations is being used;
[C4℄ all but one of the shares, and if the shares have varying
properties, that the missing share is one of those with the least
power.
We also always assume that an opponent has unlimited resour es to
atta k the s heme. In the next se tion, we look at several small examples
of designs and see what an be dis overed about them when only part of a
de ning set is known.

4. Partial De ning Sets of Designs

A minimal de ning set, S , of a design D provides a small amount of
data from whi h D an be re onstru ted uniquely. Analogous subsets of
Latin squares are alled riti al. These were rst studied in onne tion
with a problem at Rothamsted Experimental Station; see Nelder [?℄. Any
ombinatorial stru tures whi h have rules for ompletion may be used to
onstru t se ret sharing s hemes.
In parti ular we are on erned here with the problem of uniquely ompleting a 2-(v; k; ) blo k design given a proper subset of its set of blo ks B :
This is of interest in omparing the information ontent of the partial data
with that of the whole design. A proper subset of B whi h an be uniquely
ompleted must, together with the rules for ompletion, ontain the same
information as the whole design.
We study the information inherent in proper subsets of B ompletable
to at least two distin t designs, and in the minimal de ning sets of su h
designs. Our approa h is related to that of Fitina, Seberry and Chaudhry
[?℄ for Latin squares.
Let S be a de ning set of a design D = (X; B ) and let B 2 B be a
blo k of S : We make the following de nitions, using the term ` olle tion',
as oppposed to `set', when repeated obje ts may o ur. However in our
small examples multiple blo ks and multiple partial blo ks do not arise.
7

Nest:

N (S ; B); the nest of B in S ; is the set of blo ks of S nfB g; together

with all the omplete and partial blo ks for ed by the presen e of
S n fB g: More pre isely, we write

N (S ; B) = (S n fB g) [ N 0 [ N 00
where N 0 and N 00 are, respe tively, the olle tion of omplete blo ks
for ed by SnfB g; and the olle tion of partial blo ks for ed by SnfB g
ex luding those partial blo ks of t or fewer elements sin e these are
already for ed by the parameters of the design.

P (S ; B); the power of B in S ; is the number of ompletions of
S n fB g to a design with the parameters of D.
In uen e: I (S ; B); the in uen e of B in S ; is the number of omplete
blo ks in the design D whi h are not for ed when the rules for ompletion are applied to S n fB g:
Strongbox: S(S ); the strongbox of S ; is the set of omplete blo ks of B
not ontained in the nest of any blo k of S ; that is, the set of blo ks
Power:

whi h annot be found from any proper subset of the minimal de ning
set S of D:

In order to test the suitability of a de ning set S to be used for a se ret
sharing s heme we need to assess how easy it is for an atta ker to guess the
design from partial information.
We onsider three small examples, ea h with t = 2: In Example 1,
t = k 1; in Examples 2 and 3, t < k 1: In Examples 1 and 2,  = 1; in
Example 3,  = 2: In Example 1, the smallest de ning set (4 blo ks) has a
strongbox of 6 blo ks but the other minimal de ning set (5 blo ks) has a
strongbox of only one blo k. In Example 2, the two smallest de ning sets
have six blo ks ea h, but one has a strongbox of three blo ks and the other
of only one blo k. In Example 3, the two smallest de ning sets have ve
blo ks ea h and ea h has a strongbox onsisting of one blo k.
We note that the designs of Examples 1 and 2 are related, in that the
rst is a residual of the se ond. However we have been unable to relate the
behaviour of their de ning sets.

8

Example 1

Suppose we wish to re reate the 2-(9; 3; 1) design D1 ; given that the parameters are known, from one of the minimal de ning sets S(4) and S(5) :
This is the aÆne plane of order 3.
Table 2 shows the blo ks of S(4) ; the triples in their nests, and the pairs
still required to omplete the design, where (x) denotes the set of pairs
overed by the blo k x: Ea h blo k in S(4) has power 4, and in uen e 8.
Thus knowing three of the four blo ks in the de ning set gives a 1 in 4
han e of nding the orre t design. The strongbox of S(4) is S(S(4) ) =
f7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12g: This shows the possibility of having a strongbox bigger
than the original de ning set.
B

1
2
4
5

N 0 (S

(4)

6
6
3
3

; B)

N 00 (S
;
;
;
;

(4)

; B)

Pairs still needed
(1; 3; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)
(2; 3; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)
(4; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)
(5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12)

Table 2: Properties of S(4) in design D1
Table 3 shows the analogous information for S(5) ; using the notation
(x) as before. Ea h blo k in S(5) has power 2, and in uen e 6. Thus
knowing four of the ve blo ks in the de ning set gives a 1 in 2 han e of
nding the orre t design. The strongbox of S(5) is S(S(5) ) = f2g: Sin e 2
onsists of the elements 4,5,6, this might for example be used to store the
ombination of a lo k.
B

1
4
5
7
11

N 0 (S

(5)

; B)

3, 6
8, 9
10, 12
6, 8
6, 10

N 00 (S
;
;
;
;
;

(5)

; B)

Pairs still needed
(1; 2; 8; 9; 10; 12)
(2; 3; 4; 6; 10; 12)
(2; 3; 5; 6; 8; 9)
(2; 3; 7; 9; 10; 12)
(2; 3; 8; 9; 11; 12)

Table 3: Properties of S(5) in design D1
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No se ret sharing s heme in whi h a blo k of a design is given to a
shareholder is perfe t. For example, on a given set of 9 elements, there are
840 2-(9,3,1) designs, but if one blo k is spe i ed, only 120 of these are
possible. The strongbox tells us the portion of the design with regard to
whi h the s heme is onditionally perfe t.
In this example, t = k 1; so the maximal partial blo ks for ed by the
subsets of minimal de ning sets are always t-sets, that is, in this ase, pairs.
Thus N 00 = ;: Also, sin e  = 1; N 0 is always a set.

Example 2

Consider the 2-(13; 4; 1) design, unique to isomorphism; this is the proje tive plane of order 3, isomorphi to an extension of D1 : The quarti residues
modulo 13, together with 0, form a starter blo k for the design P ; that is,
P = f0; 1; 3; 9g is taken as the rst blo k, and the remaining blo ks formed
by addition modulo 13. Letting A, B, C respe tively denote 10, 11, 12,
we have 1 = P; 2 = P + 1 = 124A; 3 = P + 2 = 235B and so on, till
0 = P + C = C028: This design is symmetri ; that is, it has b = v and
onsequently also r = k: Its smallest de ning sets have 6 blo ks ea h [?℄.
B

1
2
3
4
5
6

N 0 (S

( )

; B)

9,A
8,A
9,C
A,C
8,C
8,9

N 00 (S ; B)
1B0 n 0; 78C n 7
270 n 2; 9BC n B
370 n 2; 8AB n A
47B n 6; 890 n 8
5B0 n 0; 79A n 9
67B n 6; AC0 n C

K2;9

( )

(0,7;
(2,B;
(2,A;
(6,8;
(9,0;
(6,C;

1,2,3,6,8,9,A,B,C)
1,4,6,7,8,9,A,C,0)
3,5,6,7,8,9,B,C,0)
2,3,4,7,9,A,B,C,0)
2,4,5,6,7,8,A,B,C)
1,2,5,7,8,9,A,B,0)

Table 4: Properties of S( ) in design P
In a 2-(v; k; 1) design, the set of all the blo ks whi h do not ontain some
xed element form a de ning set [?℄. In this parti ular ase, six of the nine
su h blo ks form a smallest de ning set, su h as S(8) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 7g
whi h omits the element 8. The only other smallest de ning set is isomorphi to S( ) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g onsisting of six onse utive blo ks.
Table 4 shows the blo ks of S( ) ; the blo ks and partial blo ks in their
nests, and the pairs still needed in the ompletion to a design with the
10

parameters of P : In des ribing triples in the nest of blo k 1, for instan e,
we use the notation 1B0 n 0 to mean that from ea h of the blo ks 1, B
and 0, we delete the element 0, leaving the triples 139, 6AB and 28C in
N 00 (S( ) ; 1): The rightmost olumn shows the pairs still needed; sin e they
happen to form a opy of the omplete bipartite graph K2;9 we show only
the labels of the two parts of this graph. Ea h blo k of this de ning set
has power 2 and in uen e 6, and the strongbox onsists of three blo ks,
S(S( ) ) = f7; B; 0g:
B

1
2
3
4
5
7

N 0 (S

(8)

; B)

9,0
8,C
9,A
B,0
8,0
8,9

N 00 (S ; B)
16C n 1; 8AB n A
690 n 8; 2AB n A
680 n 8; 3BC n B
689 n 8; 4AC n C
56A n 5; 9BC n B
67B n 6; AC0 n C

K2;9

(8)

(1,A;
(8,A;
(8,B;
(8,C;
(9,0;
(6,C;

3,5,6,7,8,9,B,C,0)
1,2,4,5,6,9,B,C,0)
1,2,3,5,6,7,A,C,0)
1,3,4,5,6,7,9,A,B)
2,4,5,6,7,8,A,B,C)
1,2,5,7,8,9,A,B,0)

Table 5: Properties of S(8) in design P
Table 5 shows the blo ks of S(8) ; the blo ks and partial blo ks in their
nests, and the pairs still needed in the ompletion to a design with the
parameters of P : We use the same notation as in Table 4 for listing the
triples and pairs. Again ea h blo k of the de ning set has power 2 and
in uen e 6, but now the strongbox onsists of only one blo k, S(S(8) ) = f6g:
Here we have an example where, although power and in uen e of blo ks
in ea h de ning set are the same, the nests in ea h ase ontain six triples,
and the pairs still needed for ompletion orrespond to the 18 edges of K2;9 ;
the strongboxes are of quite di erent sizes. In either ase however, knowing
ve of the six blo ks of a smallest de ning set gives us a 1 in 2 han e of
nding the orre t design.

Example 3

Consider the 2-(11; 5; 2) design, unique to isomorphism. The quadrati
residues modulo 11 form a starter blo k for the design Q; that is, Q =
f1; 3; 4; 5; 9g is taken as the rst blo k, and the remaining blo ks formed
by addition modulo 11. Letting A denote 10, we have 1 = Q; 2 = Q + 1 =
11

3 = Q + 2 = 35670 and so on, till 0 = Q + A = 02348: This design
is also symmetri and its smallest de ning set has 5 blo ks [?, ?℄.

2456A;

In a symmetri 2-(v; k; 2) design, the set of all the blo ks whi h do not
ontain some xed element form a de ning set [?℄. In this parti ular ase,
any ve of the six su h blo ks form a smallest de ning set [?℄. We onsider
the set C0 of blo ks whi h do not ontain the element 0, that is, the set of
blo ks f1; 2; 4; 5; 6; Ag = C0 :
Table 6 shows what portions of the design an be ompleted from any
of the 15 sets of four blo ks at a time whi h an be hosen from C0 : For
instan e, given any of the sets f1, 2, 4, 5g or f4, 5, 6, Ag or f1, 2, 6, Ag,
ompletion for es one extra whole blo k, 9, and six partial blo ks, ea h of
whi h ontains four elements. In the partial blo ks, either 7 or 8 must be
added as shown to give a omplete blo k, and hoosing 7 or 8 in any one
ase for es the rest of the design. Thus there are two possible ompletions
of the set f1, 2, 4, 5g: hoosing the rst option to omplete ea h partial
blo k gives the original design; hoosing the se ond option gives the design

f1; 2; 4; 5; 9g [ f123A8; 35608; 49A08; 369A7; 15A07; 23407g:
For ea h smallest de ning set ontained in C0 ; the power of ea h blo k is

2 sin e two ompletions are possible in ea h ase; similarly sin e six blo ks
are not for ed in ea h ompletion, the in uen e of ea h blo k is 6. Thus
knowing any four blo ks of C0 gives us a 1 in 2 han e of nding the orre t
design.
In this ase, we an regard the set C0 n fAg as a de ning set S1 ; the set
C0 n f6g as a de ning set S2 and the set f1, 2, 4, 5g as either S1 n f6g or
S2 n fAg: Then in our previous notation, N 0 (S1 ; 6) = N 0 (S2 ; A) = 9; and

N 00 (S ; 6) = N 00 (S ; A) =
f123A; 3560; 49A0; 369A; 15A0; 2340g [
f3A7; 1A7; 237; 367; 507; 307; 9A7; A07; 407g [
f3A8; 368; 9A8; 1A8; 508; A08; 238; 308; 408g:
Now regard the set f1, 2, 4, 5g as S n f6g: To nd the strongbox of
S = f1; 2; 4; 5; 6g; note that the only blo k neither in the set S , nor
for ed by any of its 4-blo k subsets, is the blo k A; hen e S(S ) = fAg:
Similarly, S(S ) = f6g:
1

2

1

1

1

1

2
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Given blo ks

N0

1, 2, 4, 5

9

4, 5, 6, A
1, 2, 6, A
1, 2, 4, 6

8

1, 5, 6, A
2, 4, 5, A
1, 2, 4, A

3

1, 4, 5, 6
2, 5, 6, A
1, 2, 5, 6

0

1, 4, 5, A
2, 4, 6, A
1, 2, 5, A
2, 4, 5, 6
1, 4, 6, A

7

Completions
123A[78℄,
369A[87℄,
1459[3A℄,
2456[A3℄,
2789[45℄,
1678[54℄,
127A[39℄,
2578[93℄,
456A[27℄,
3560[72℄,
79A0[46℄,
389A[64℄,
3480[2A℄,
4790[A2℄,
256A[14℄,
2690[41℄,
15A0[89℄,
1345[98℄,
1478[6A℄,
1580[A6℄,
3670[59℄,
368A[95℄,
3459[17℄,
3560[71℄,
58A0[13℄,
5670[31℄,
18A0[25℄,
3480[52℄,
1290[68℄,
2579[86℄,

3560[78℄,
15A0[87℄,
5670[3A℄,
1580[A3℄,
3670[45℄,
2380[54℄,
5670[39℄,
47A0[93℄,
3480[27℄,
49A0[72℄,
1359[46℄,
3570[64℄,
5789[2A℄,
3689[A2℄,
79A0[14℄,
237A[41℄,
1467[89℄,
47A0[98℄,
3570[6A℄,
4790[A6℄,
246A[59℄,
47A0[95℄,
2690[17℄,
49A0[71℄,
2690[13℄,
689A[31℄,
1349[25℄,
137A[52℄,
245A[68℄,
15A0[86℄,

49A0[78℄
2340[87℄
2480[3A℄
4790[A3℄
18A0[45℄
79A0[54℄
2480[39℄
1260[93℄
1690[27℄
1468[72℄
2380[46℄
1290[64℄
1690[2A℄
1580[A2℄
2380[14℄
58A0[41℄
2340[89℄
1260[98℄
1290[6A℄
1237[A6℄
18A0[59℄
1260[95℄
58A0[17℄
2589[71℄
4678[13℄
2480[31℄
3670[25℄
1690[52℄
3570[68℄
2340[86℄

Table 6: 2-(11; 5; 2) design ompletions from four blo ks of C0
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The other smallest de ning set (up to isomorphism) of this design onsists of any four blo ks ontaining one parti ular element, together with any
blo k not ontaining it. We onsider here the de ning set S5 = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g
in whi h all the blo ks ex ept 4 ontain the element 5. Table 7 shows information orresponding to that of Table 6, for the blo ks 1, 2, 3 and 5; in
fa t, that for blo k 3 repeats the rst line of the previous table so we need
not re al ulate N 00 :
Given blo ks

N0

2, 3, 4, 5

0

1, 3, 4, 5

6

1, 2, 4, 5

9

1, 2, 3, 4

A

Completions
127A[30℄,
1269[03℄,
2380[41℄,
2690[14℄,
3560[78℄,
15A0[87℄,
1690[2A℄,
1580[A2℄,

1459[30℄,
158A[03℄,
79A0[41℄,
58A0[14℄,
49A0[78℄,
2340[87℄,
0348[2A℄,
4790[A2℄,

689A[30℄
479A[03℄
256A[41℄
237A[14℄
123A[78℄
369A[87℄
5789[2A℄
3689[A2℄

Table 7: 2-(11; 5; 2) design ompletions from four blo ks of S5
Blo k 4 behaves rather di erently: the set f1, 2, 3, 5g for es the
additional omplete blo k 8 = N 0 (S5 ; 4); the two possible ompletions are
either the original design Q ontaining the blo ks

U = f3689A; 14678; 1237A; 479A0; 23480; 12690g
or a new design Q0 ontaining the blo ks
U 0 = f12470; 239A0; 46890; 12368; 1679A; 3478Ag:
This ordering shows the blo ks in U and U 0 as disjoint pairs, but to
al ulate N 00 we need to look at interse tions. This time N 00 ontains no

partial blo ks of size 4, but instead onsists of 30 triples:

N 00 (S5 ; 4) =
f39A; 689; 368; 69A; 38A; 147; 468; 168; 167; 478g [
f127; 23A; 123; 17A; 37A; 470; 9A0; 490; 79A; 47Ag [
f240; 230; 480; 238; 348; 120; 290; 690; 126; 169g:
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These triples form a partially balan ed blo k design, in whi h ea h pair of
elements hosen from the set f1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, 0g appears
in either four triples (for 15 pairs) or one triple (for the remaining 30 pairs).
Again the power of ea h blo k in S5 is 2, and its in uen e is 6, so as
before, knowing four of the ve blo ks of this de ning set gives a 1 in 2
han e of nding the orre t design. The strongbox S(S5 ) = f7g: However,
a 4-element subset of the blo k 7 appears in ea h of the nests of S5 for
the blo ks 1, 2, 3 or 5, and ve 3-element subsets of 7 for the blo k 4,
suggesting, rst, that perhaps this strongbox is not parti ularly se ure and,
se ondly, that we should also onsider the use of partial blo ks in a de ning
set.
We note that, if we onsider the blo k numbers as the elements of a
dual design, then the 66 sets of ve blo ks whi h are not de ning sets of
the design Q form a 4-(11; 5; 1) design.

5. Further Questions

The examples dis ussed above have been hosen to illustrate the onepts of nest, power, in uen e and strongbox, but are far too small for
pra ti al use. We are now investigating similar stru tures in larger designs,
with a view to determining their suitability for realisti appli ations.
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